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Brexit as postindustrial critique 
Felix Ringel, Durham University 
 
Abstract 
Anthropologists and other commentators struggle to make sense of pre-COVID-19 political 
developments in the postindustrial Global North. Various narratives were created to explain 
these dramatic events and changes, deploying an armory of social science analysis. We could 
approach one of these worrying developments, Brexit, as a postindustrial phenomenon. To 
make this case, I will compare my ethnographic material from postindustrial German cities 
with my experience in North East England as a non-UK, EU citizen. I argue that Brexit is not 
just a delayed response to economic decline and insecurity, epitomized in the 2008 financial 
crisis and subsequent times of austerity. Rather, Brexit indicates that the former industrialized 
countries of the Global North have not yet redefined their political and economic 
organization. Further, they have not developed an idea of what life after the postindustrial 
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Amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic, mentioning Brexit feels incongruous—an issue 
belonging to a distant era. Yet Brexit has not gone away and, sooner or later, it will be back 
on our plates. That is why we should continue to prepare for it. To reflect on Brexit, I will 
follow anthropological tradition and start with a few vignettes. These vignettes are 
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stereotypically pessimistic, as are many expert and academic analyses of the Brexit 
phenomenon, and they do not serve to guide the reader into a well-studied ethnographic field. 
They will remain partial to my experiences. They take us back before the current crisis, into 
late 2019. One concerns a friend, the others myself. We are both non-UK, EU citizens 
working at Durham University. We both live near Durham, a city in North East England. 
This postindustrial region was amongst the first to vote Leave in the 2016 referendum, even 
though it was likely to be amongst those hardest hit by Britain’s exit from the European 
Union, given the amount of EU funding it currently receives. 
 My friend Anna and I were both born in Berlin, Germany: she in West Berlin, I in the 
East. Anna partly grew up in Switzerland. In the autumn of 2019, when most UK newspapers 
were still dominated by the aftermath of the 2016 referendum, Anna took a taxi from Durham 
city to her home in a nearby former mining village. Her mother called her halfway, and the 
two spoke shortly on the phone, most probably in German, potentially some of it in Swiss 
German. Suddenly the taxi driver stopped and told Anna to get out. He was not taking any 
Polish people in his taxi, he said. Anna shrugged this off, and walked home. Still, this taxi 
driver’s doubly misguided xenophobia, adverse to his own economic interest, shocked her 
friends and colleagues. This comparatively insignificant event is indicative of what some UK 
nationals think about EU immigrants, and their right to live and work in the UK. What had 
happened to the solidarity of the North East, which still prides itself for its passionate fight 
against Thatcher’s neoliberal reforms of the welfare state during the 1980s miners’ strike? 
How came it that in the December 2019 UK General Election the former Labour strongholds 
referred to as the “Red Wall” disintegrated and turned blue, voting for the Conservatives and 
their slogan “Get Brexit Done”? 
 UK academics voted overwhelmingly to Remain, which perhaps contributed to the 
shock amongst my Durham colleagues at the election results. Although nothing like Anna’s 
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incident happened to me, I found I had unconsciously developed an eerie sense of caution 
and fear, a feeling of being different, something that privileged EU immigrants like myself 
had rarely felt before—all Hitler jokes aside. This feeling of being different, of not belonging 
any more, was also evoked in moments that were meant to be helpful rather than insulting. 
For example, the UK government tested its EU settlement scheme at many UK universities, 
and Durham University began implementing this by arranging a meeting for its non-UK, EU 
employees.  The invitation email had felt bad enough, but when we all turned up at this 
meeting, we felt even more awkward, as if we were being picked out. The new reality of a 
segregated Brexit future was materializing. Against our will, our existence in the UK had 
been rendered problematic.  
I especially notice my new caution whenever I take the train further north from 
Durham, and cross the border to Scotland. Once over this intranational border, my body 
relaxes. I am not as much on edge anymore. Knowing that Scotland largely voted to remain 
in the EU allows me to let my guard down. There seem to be more EU immigrants in 
Edinburgh and other parts of Scotland—you hear their (sometimes strong) Scottish-European 
accents. Back in Durham, I am less at ease with public interactions. People often ask where 
my accent is from, and I cannot hear that question innocently anymore. Every joke, however 
benevolent in tone, I cannot but put into a context that I dramatize more than the person 
making the joke. But why do I feel, and thereby reproduce, the difference invoked and to a 
certain extent reinvented by the Brexiteers? And how else could I approach my potentially 
Leave-voting neighbors here in England’s postindustrial North East?  
 The last time I had such a profound feeling of caution was as a young boy, at another 
time of rupture: after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany’s subsequent 
reunification in 1990. On my family’s return from our 1991, first-ever holiday in Western 
Europe, ironically allowed by an earlier form of the EU’s freedom of mobility, we had 
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stopped in Frankfurt am Main to meet my father’s West German pen pal. We made the 
mistake of parking near the main train station, and everything state socialism had warned us 
about Western capitalism was there: homelessness, begging, prostitution, drugs. My older 
sister started crying. I became silent. We left once my father realized we would not relax 
again in the foreseeable future. Only after we crossed the former inner-German border did we 
relax in the knowledge of being safe again. 
 The comparison of the experiential aftermath of the peaceful reunification of a 
formerly divided Germany with the projected departure of the UK from the European Union 
is in many ways farfetched. However, I have added the third, seemingly unrelated vignette 
for several reasons. First, it allows me to make a further argument about my own experience 
of the aftermath of Brexit. For an East Berliner like myself, and for many Eastern and other 
Europeans of my generation, the post-Cold War experience is one of dissolving borders. My 
life was marked by the aforementioned fall of the Berlin Wall when I was eight years old and 
by the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004. Whenever other walls were erected, such as the 
ones between Israel and Palestine or between the US and Mexico (not to mention the ones 
around fortress Europe!), I struggled to make sense of them. The result of the Brexit 
referendum was an affront to my inner convictions against borders despite the fact that there 
are many and good reasons to be critical of the EU as an organization.  
 Second, a comparison to the German context might be productive in another way. 
Unexpected electoral successes for right-wing populist parties are a phenomenon shared 
around the world, particularly in what was long referred to as the Global North. Neo-
nationalist policies are propagated by the Brexit-Tories in the UK, Trump in the US, Orban in 
Hungary, and the PiS party in Poland. Their German equivalent is the AfD, the Alternative 
für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany). This right-wing German party celebrated its 
biggest electoral victories in former socialist East Germany. Statistically, media 
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commentators are eager to point out, East Germans feel much more drawn to this party’s 
political agenda and personnel. In 2019 state elections in three East German Länder (states), 
the AfD gained more than a quarter of all votes. Its results seemed similar to gains of the 
Brexit party or Johnson’s hard Brexiteer-led Tory party. However, another similarity is that 
in both cases most media and academic commentators had rendered problematic the 
irrationality of the seemingly misguided voter groups: those voting for Brexit in the UK and, 
in the German context, particularly those East Germans who, even if they had not voted for 
the AfD, still seemed prone to neo-nationalism. I have not read any serious accounts 
questioning the rationality of Remain voters or non-AfD voting West Germans—but that 
might be because I am stuck in my own media echo chamber. Even their political opponents, 
however, do not seem to dispute their reasoning much. 
 Third, a comparison with the German context might be productive because it allows 
us to think through the different approaches and contexts we can muster as anthropologists to 
explore the phenomenon of Brexit. Indeed, as these initial similarities and differences already 
indicate, there are different ways of making sense of neo-nationalist developments. For a 
Brexit toolbox, these narratives demand anthropological scrutiny. My proposal is to view 
Brexit as a postindustrial phenomenon, and not just because East Germany’s shock-therapy 
de-industrialization after reunification lends itself so neatly to this story. The category of the 
postindustrial allows a whole variety of different approaches to, and conceptualizations of, 
Brexit, from culturalist to political economy ones. However, it has its own temporal 
ramifications—not just with regards to the past, but also to the future (compare Anderson and 
Wilson 2018; Anderson et al. 2019). I will get back to these temporal issues at the end of this 
piece. Let me now unpack the different approaches that come to light when comparing 
commentaries to neo-nationalisms in the UK and Germany.       
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 In the UK, commentators frequently muse on the motivations of Leave voters. They 
usually start from a lack of understanding. Whether media journalists or (younger) family 
members, they all face the problem that they cannot comprehend exactly why one would 
want to leave the EU. I, too, have often lost track of what the whole thing was about and I 
struggled to decipher the vehemence and rigor with which outspoken Brexiteers condemned 
the EU and their political opponents. The question of truth in populism arose for me: do these 
Brexiteers actually believe in what they are arguing for, or are their often absurd claims only 
a tool to gain power, with other motives in mind? Indeed, if they were frank about the true 
motivations behind their schemes, I could take them more seriously. However, in the UK, 
even many Remain voters seem to have no idea about how the EU actually works, and the 
limits of its power. So what was the whole drama about? 
 In the German case, by contrast, the problematization of voters’ motivation to vote for 
neo-nationalist populists was fully regionalized (although, again, in the UK, Brexit seemed to 
be very much an English and Welsh preoccupation, too, since, like Scotland, the majority in 
Northern Ireland has also voted for Remain). The fewer West German AfD voters could 
easily be categorized as disappointed conservatives. In contrast, the media was obsessed with 
the comparatively more East German AfD voters. Particularly around the 30th anniversary of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 2019, media exegeses were investigating the East 
German soul. The framework deployed was most often a culturalist one. Even though three 
decades had already passed since the demise of state socialism, the statistical affinity of East 
German voters to the AfD was seen as a legacy of socialism, a wish for a return to an 
authoritarian party state and an expression of an enduring innate xenophobia, all 
conceptualized as a matter of an East German mentality. Predominantly West German AfD 
politicians heavily exploited this idea in the 2019 East German state elections. They used 
slogans reminiscent of the 1989 peaceful revolution such as “Complete the Revolution!” 
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(Vollenende die Wende!), “Then as Now: Freedom Instead of Socialism!” (Damals wie heute: 
Freiheit statt Sozialismus!), and “The East Rises!” (Der Osten steht auf!), evoking a “Turn 
2.0” (Wende 2.0) and, in a rhetoric similar to the Leave and Trump campaigns, arguing to 
“Take Back Your Country” (Hol Dir Dein Land Zurück!). They also styled themselves as a 
protest party, through which those who feel left behind can finally show the established 
“political elite” (West Germans associated with Brussels, but never Westminster, if put in the 
UK’s terms) what they really think. 
 Some journalists blamed the failed reunification that had reduced East Germans to 
politically and economically “second-class citizens” (Bürger zweiter Klasse); others drew 
attention to the fact that, economically, the East German Länder were actually doing quite 
well, with low unemployment and rising income levels. The more than two-thirds of the East 
German electorate who voted for other parties did not disturb the all-encompassing cultural 
logic of these debates. Similar postsocialist arguments were proposed for explaining right-
wing electoral successes all over Eastern Europe, but all of them ultimately failed to define 
the present moment because their cultural essentialism and historical determinism fell short 
of seeing these electoral choices as a form of critique or agency (compare Mair 2017).  
 Some more complex accounts evoked the historical context of the recent crises, 
including the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 so-called European refugee crisis, explaining 
recent expressions of discontent as a somewhat delayed response to these crises. Indeed, East 
Germans, Eastern Europeans, and Brexit voters alike were usually depicted as the victims of 
globalization (epitomized in the financial crisis), who have not only lost their jobs, but whose 
livelihoods, stretched by austerity (implemented in the aftermath of the very same crisis), 
were then threatened by migrants and refugees (in 2015), who were seen to overwhelm 
whatever remained of the welfare state in each national setting. 
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 Forms of historical and cultural contextualization in these more complex accounts 
mirror what anthropologists have tentatively deployed for making sense of the 2016 Brexit 
vote or its similarly discouraging twin vote in the US presidential election later in the same 
year. In Green et al.’s timely 2016 Forum on Brexit in Social Anthropology, many colleagues 
have already deciphered the referendum result as a critique of the failures of postindustrial 
(as in, neoliberal) capitalism. However, as anthropologists we are obviously rather 
uncomfortable with explaining simple voting behaviors, patterns, or results in the first place. 
Even any retrospective judgment on Brexit would always involve more empirical work first, 
and there are many research projects on the way.1 But what kind of ethnographic object (or 
objects) is Brexit and how are we to study it? Or rather, how can I learn to understand those 
who voted for Brexit across my critical distance? 
 With the comparison to East Germany, I have had to reject outright culturalist and 
historically deterministic readings of Brexit phenomena. As an East German, I feel offended 
when people reduce me or other East Germans to a certain East German culture and thereby 
limit their and my agency. In the UK setting, such approaches also fail. The formerly proud 
miners and energy workers (at least that is what they would have been called in socialist East 
Germany) of the English North East are not culturally determined to be anti-European, and 
not all old and less educated white English men are born Brexiteers (as some analyses 
suggest). As Felix Stein (2016) underlined early on after the Brexit vote, simple economic 
reasoning does not translate neatly into voting behavior either. From a political perspective, 
Brexit was also the surprisingly successful project of a few right-wing politicians and media 
magnates. This, in turn, does not mean, as John Mair (2017) convincingly argued, that people 
were brainwashed, and could not resist their lies. The motivations of Brexit voters may be 
 




more complex than the simple ballot choices they had to relate to. So is anthropology bound 
to fail in providing an analysis of Brexit because we refuse to reduce people to their electoral 
choices? Or will we get lost in its complexity as a political, economic, and cultural 
phenomenon that overwhelms our current analytical apparatus? 
 One of the ideas uniting current commentaries is that Brexit is an expression of 
discontent with the current situation. Even non-Leave voters share hope for change, whether 
they hope for some more of an old-fashioned welfare state or aspire to something totally 
different in the future. My gut feeling is—and a lot of scholars of affect seem to share this 
(for one example, Berlant 2011)—that Brexit and other expressions of neo-nationalism need 
to be approached as postindustrial phenomena. More specifically, they can be seen as a form 
of postindustrial critique. However, I am less interested in the “post,” which simply helps to 
extrapolate the social and cultural enormity of the decline of industrial life. Indeed, the recent 
changes in economic and social organization of societies of the Global North had severe 
repercussions. They produced winners and losers, but they shook the fundamental beliefs and 
convictions of most. My work in German postindustrial cities speaks to this (for example, 
Ringel 2018a). People in these places, most of them on the losing end of new political 
economies, have had to redefine what makes a good life in the first place. They also had to 
renegotiate their relations to time in general and to the future more specifically (Guyer 2007). 
 However, to avoid all determinism (postindustrial crises do not necessarily lead to 
neo-nationalism!), I propose that “the postindustrial” could not only be understood as a 
reference to the severity of the changes that have happened since at least the 1980s and in 
most parts of the world. What the recent years and decades, to a certain extent, have fostered, 
is less a feeling of nostalgia for the industrial era. Life was hard during Cold War times, too, 
and industries exuded their own toxicities and adverse effects on human health and sociality. 
Rather, the postindustrial era has helped to cultivate amongst many the urge for new 
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securities. This era can then be defined less by what it is “post” to, than by a different prefix, 
one that captures anticipation. Unfortunately, we simply lack a mode of expressing 
something era-defining with a “pre-”. However, this is what I have in mind—the problem 
with Brexit, and the motivations that lead to the result of the 2016 referendum, as human 
geographers and sociologists have pointed out, have much to do with the future (Anderson et 
al. 2019). And I argue that anthropologists should take up the challenge of unpacking these 
futures, too (see, for example, Bryant and Knight 2019).   
 Why not include all things futural in our analyses, not just in order to avoid culturalist 
and deterministic approaches? In the context of the so-called European refugee crisis, I have 
proposed one possible format of doing this: “ethnographic prospects” (Ringel 2018b). I 
argued that we should look ahead with our informants to the future after the crisis as well as 
exploring the futures that continue to emerge during it. For that we should consciously deploy 
the two most important tools we bring to this exercise: comparisons to other times and places 
and an attention to detail. Indeed, how could and should the postindustrial future—a future 
both Leave and Remain voters aspire to—look? How should postindustrial societies organize 
their social, economic and political relations? What makes a good life in the postindustrial 
era, and which institutions can help sustain it? Anthropologists may not be adept at 
unpacking voting results (because we cherish complexity, not the relative simplicity of 
statistics), but we are trained to contextualize phenomena. Brexit may be a delayed response 
to the recent crises of neoliberal capitalism, but what future contexts should we embed it in, 
too? What are the many future concerns, hopes, and fears in which Brexit was and will be 
reproduced and renegotiated? We might need less a view from the past to explain Brexit, and 
more of an attention to the future hopes and fears it expressed and evoked. 
 Some might argue that taking Brexit voters (and AfD-voting East Germans) seriously 
as voicing a form of critique of the present prevents us from also engaging critically with 
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their loud racist and xenophobic undertones. These things are not mutually exclusive. 
Similarly, some might think we cannot embark on scrutinizing the postindustrial future 
without working through the demise of the industrial past. In East Germany, for example, 
there are many recent examples of this quintessentially German exercise of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, a working through the past. Only now are people critically 
assessing the downfalls of reunification across the board. Many commentators particularly 
scrutinize the history of the Treuhandanstalt, the organization in charge of the former GDR’s 
almost wholesale de-industrialization—that is, the privatization (and often liquidation) of the 
previously state-owned (volkseigen) East German industrial combines, businesses, and 
factories. However, a serious debate about Margaret Thatcher’s (and later, under New 
Labour, Tony Blair’s) efforts in neo-liberalization, and the sociocultural consequences on the 
lives of people throughout the UK, would not replace what is much more necessary: a 
discussion about what the postindustrial future should look like.  
 For many people, including Anna and me, this future can still include the UK’s 
membership in the EU (hopefully a thoroughly reformed EU). Although it hurts me to want 
to take the aforementioned taxi driver’s xenophobia seriously as a form of postindustrial 
critique, I still see it as my job as an anthropologist to engage with his beliefs and 
worldviews. I can still call him a racist after I have found out what he thinks and why he 
believes in Brexit, and I do not have to reduce him to a “stupid Northerner” brainwashed by 
Boris Johnson and the like. There may even be something he and I can agree upon, 
something we wish for in the future, that might politically unite us.  
 Anthropology has tools at its disposal to engage with contemporary situations and 
their complex nature. As usual, the discipline will have to scrutinize its own preconceptions 
when approaching Brexit as a cultural, political, and/or economic phenomenon. However, it 
will also have to scrutinize its own expectations, political and otherwise, for what the result 
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and aftermath of the Brexit referendum should have been like. The shock most of us 
experienced refers to a failure of these expectations. We have to engage critically with 
postindustrial forms of capitalism, but also explore the many postindustrial futures our 
interlocutors engage with in their professional and personal lives. Finally, we should offer our 
forms of critique of the present in response to what other people have to say about the current 
situation, and formally engage in the many participatory and inclusive processes that make up 
a democracy. Arguably, the actual British exit from the EU has not even happened yet (as we 
sit in an impasse of a transitional period and apocalyptic trance). As a “pre-” phenomenon, it 
should give us reason enough to work through the future and push our own agenda for what 
that future, as Brexit or not, could and should look like in detail. There is one last benefit of a 
focus on futures. 
 In the week of the UK’s nominal departure from the EU, on 31 January 2020 I taught 
one of my third-year undergraduate classes on the topic of “Capitalism in Ruins.” In 
anticipation of the UK’s exit, I added some deep-felt sense of sadness and despair to my 
usual feeling of caution. I mentioned as much to my students in a vague, throw-away remark 
at the beginning of class about this not being a good week and my hope they would get well 
through the coming Friday. They struggled to get the reference. The actual Brexit, whose 
planned official celebrations in Downing Street and elsewhere had already deeply upset me, 
suddenly appeared in this short interaction as a non-event. Sure, the real changes would hit 
these students later, but it was their future opportunities that were being restricted on that 
Friday. Was I emotionally overreacting? I found their tepid, sober response to the actual day 
of Brexit frightening. We must continue to force proponents of Brexit to lay out the future 
they promise in detail—the better to hold them to account afterwards. And this scrutiny will 
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